The Allure of Blood
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In a well-known tale entitled “How to Kill a Wolf,” there exists a captivating story that sheds light on the cunning tactics employed by Alaskan hunters. It reveals the profound attraction of wolves to the scent of blood, which stirs within them an insatiable bloodthirstiness. By leveraging this vulnerability, the resourceful hunters devised a simple yet effective trap to ensnare and hunt these formidable creatures. The Alaskan hunters ingeniously crafted a bait using a knife, recognizing that wolves are irresistibly drawn to the aroma of blood. They would coat the blade’s tip with blood and meticulously freeze it, meticulously layering it with additional coatings, effectively creating what one might describe as a “blood popsicle.”
Subsequently, they would affix the blood-coated knife to a sturdy object, ensuring its stability. The alluring scent of blood, wafting through the air for miles around, would lure the hungry wolf towards the trap. Overwhelmed with an intense craving, the wolf would approach the knife, driven by a potent sense of hunger. At first, a sense of euphoria and pleasure would pervade the creature’s being. The wolf, captivated by the blade, would repeatedly lick it, unaware of the impending danger. Eventually, the razor-sharp edge would slice their tongue, reducing it to tatters. However, the wolf’s inability to discern its own blood from that on the blade would deceive it into believing that it was relishing an extraordinary feast. In this manner, the wolf would unwittingly fall victim to its own instinctual desires, ultimately leading to its demise.
Analogously, a similar fate befell the Russian invaders in Bakhmut, drawing parallels to this allegorical account. The cunning Ukrainians, mindful of the wolves’ proclivities, orchestrated a clever trap, akin to the hunters’ stratagem.
New York (RichTVX.com) —
According to analysts at the American Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Prigozhin and Kadyrov are endeavoring to shift the blame for the failures in the Bakhmut region onto the Russian army. Their objective is to depict the regular Russian army as ineffectual and establish circumstances that would hold the Ministry of Defense accountable for all the setbacks.
The latest report from the Institute suggests that Prigozhin’s decision to delegate responsibility for Bakhmut to his like-minded security official serves as a maneuver to marginalize the involvement of airborne units operating on the flanks. By doing so, he aims to present the battle for the city exclusively as a mission undertaken by Wagner, and now also Kadyrov’s forces. This strategic move allows Prigozhin, who lacks confidence in the Russian military command and positions himself independently, to save face if the Wagner PMC forces fail in their attempt to capture Bakhmut. On the other hand, Kadyrov could gain reputational advantages by participating in such a prominent operation with the backing of Prigozhin’s personal authority. Should the Chechen Akhmat unit encounter the same difficulties as the Wagnerites and fail to fully seize Bakhmut, Prigozhin and Kadyrov may very well attribute the inadequacy of their efforts to the Defense Ministry’s failure to provide sufficient support.
Furthermore, if the Russian military command obstructs the replacement of Wagner PMCs by Akhmat forces (as it remains uncertain whether these units can execute this maneuver without the assistance of the regular Russian army), Prigozhin, Kadyrov, and their allies will likely argue that if the Ministry of Defense had endorsed their decision, the Chechen troops would have swiftly captured Bakhmut, according to the assessments made by ISW analysts. Simultaneously, Kadyrov’s claim that “Akhmat” will rapidly advance in Bakhmut and occupy it “within a matter of hours” is a characteristic display of Kadyrov’s self-aggrandizement and disregards the current tactical situation.